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Note
“Liberty and Justice for All”: Equalizing Pretrial
Detention for Wealthy and Indigent Defendants
CAIT BARRETT
Pretrial detention is affected by many factors. One of those is wealth. While the
ability to post bail is a major issue in state systems, the federal system poses a
different problem: the ability to pay for mitigating conditions. This has the potential
to create a disparate impact between wealthy defendants—who can afford
conditions that mitigate findings of flight or danger—and indigent defendants who
cannot. There are two solutions: detaining wealthy defendants to avoid disparate
release or releasing indigent defendants to avoid disparate detention. This Note
argues for the latter. It does so by focusing on the requirement for courts under the
Bail Reform Act to release defendants with the “least restrictive” conditions. A
framework for release is created by reading “least restrictive” through various
lenses. First, reading “least restrictive” through a purposeful lens allows it to
become quite expansive, such that almost any set of conditions, as long as they
mitigate the necessary findings, allow for release. Second, a practical approach
allows “least restrictive” to be read in the context of the Bail Reform Act’s language
and mandate to argue for a broad range of conditions. Third, “least restrictive,”
read in light of societal considerations, including who bears the burden of detention,
opens up more pathways for release and demonstrates the importance of leveling
up release instead of leveling down detention. The overall goal of this Note is to
provide various analyses to help inform bail decisionmakers’ considerations and to
use this new facet of bail reform to advocate for indigent defendants.
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“Liberty and Justice for All”: Equalizing Pretrial
Detention for Wealthy and Indigent Defendants
CAIT BARRETT *
INTRODUCTION
Pretrial detention is becoming an increasing focus in scholarship across
the United States. As prison reform and mass incarceration dialogues carry
on, pretrial detention and bail reform play an important role, in part because
“[p]retrial detainees make up more than 70 percent of the U.S. jail
population – approximately 536,000 people,”1 and 75% of federal
defendants in prison are pretrial detainees, costing the federal government
$1.5 billion per year.2 Pretrial bail reform exemplifies the need for fairness
and equity in the criminal justice system as individuals are detained without
a conviction. In that vein, a large part of the current scholarship focuses on
the racial and wealth disparities present at the state-level through the practice
of money bail.3 Modern pretrial scholarship also focuses on the fairness and

*
J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law; B.A., Johns Hopkins University. I would like to
thank Professor Jamelia Morgan for advising me throughout this process; this Note would not have gone
far without her calmness and wisdom. I would also like to thank Professor Steven Wilf for his substantive
guidance on my argument and for graciously plying me with books. A special thank you to the Honorable
Robert A. Richardson and John Fries for giving me the job and experience that inspired this Note, both
of whom have been so supportive throughout my law school career. I would also like to thank my friends
for supporting me during this writing process, including reading drafts. A final thank you to my parents
and brother for giving me the opportunity and encouragement to pursue all of my passions.
1
Adureh Onyekwere, How Cash Bail Works, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/how-cash-bail-works.
2
Matthew G. Rowland, The Rising Federal Pretrial Detention Rate, in Context, 82 FED. PROB. 13,
13 (2018).
3
See LINDSEY DEVERS, BAIL DECISIONMAKING: RESEARCH SUMMARY, BUREAU OF JUST.
ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 2–3 (2011), https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/
document/BailDecisionmakingResearchSummary.pdf (citations omitted) (“[T]he true source of bias in
bail decisions might be financial rather than demographic. Although income and social disadvantage
have correlated with pretrial release, many of the characteristics overlap with those stereotypes associated
with race and ethnicity. Minority populations share many of the same social problems, such as poverty,
unemployment, greater numbers of single heads of household, lower levels of education, and increased
opportunity to commit crime. . . . It has also been found that bail decisionmakers are less likely to give
black suspects the same ‘benefit of the doubt’ they give white suspects. Black defendants are less likely
to be released from pretrial detention than are white defendants. . . . Hispanics are more likely to be
detained than are both white and black suspects.”). See also Application for Leave to File Brief Amici
Curiae and Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae National Law Professors of Criminal, Procedural, and
Constitutional Law in Support of Respondent at 15, In re Humphrey, No. S247278, 2018 WL 5465210
(Cal. Oct. 18, 2018) (asking the court to affirm the lower court’s holding that “[w]hen the government
proposes to incarcerate a person before trial, it must provide thorough justification, whether the
mechanism of detention is a transparent detention order or its functional equivalent, the imposition of
unaffordable money bail” (emphasis omitted)).
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equity of risk assessment of defendants at both the state and federal level.4
And because pretrial detention is a liminal area, the constitutionality and
legality of certain practices are oft questioned.5 It is against this backdrop
that a new6 problem in pretrial detention emerges.
In August 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit released a written opinion in United States v. Boustani,7 where the
court explained its affirmance of an order of detention for a wealthy
defendant issued in May 2019. At the center of the court’s analysis was its
desire to prevent a “two-tiered bail system,”8 where wealthy defendants are
released because they can afford conditions that mitigate findings of flight
risk and danger to the community, while indigent defendants who cannot
afford the same conditions are detained.
The idea of allowing wealthy defendants to escape to a gilded cage while
indigent defendants, releasable but for their wealth, are sent to detention
centers, potentially in another state from where they reside and are being
charged, seems fundamentally unfair. But the Bail Reform Act mandates
release when conditions mitigate any findings of flight risk or danger to the
community. To read it any other way would be to ignore the statute’s clear
directive. So, how can the Bail Reform Act, in light of this requirement, be
read to equalize release between wealthy and indigent defendants?
This Note seeks to answer that question. This Note will discuss the
gravity of pretrial detention and the effects on individuals, particularly in
4
See Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 502–03
(2012) (proposing a model for release focusing on the release “of older defendants, defendants with clean
records, and defendants charged with fraud and public-order offenses” based on an empirical study of
factors considered by judges in determining the risk of violent re-offense during release); Kristin Bechtel,
Alexander M. Holsinger, Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Madeline J. Warren, A Meta-Analytic Review of
Pretrial Research: Risk Assessment, Bond Type, and Interventions, 42 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 443, 446
(2017) (“Due to financial and resource constraints, the majority of jurisdictions still do not have an
objective and standardized pretrial risk assessment instrument available to inform the release decision.
Nonetheless, the objective use of actuarial risk assessments at any stage of justice decision making
constitutes a ‘best practice,’ and there may be consequences for not developing or adopting a pretrial risk
tool.”); Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 518–20 (2018) (challenging the
assumption that defendants are inherently more dangerous than non-defendant individuals and how that
affects the imposition of conditions and detention); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J.
2218, 2226 (2019) (demonstrating that “disparities in classification will translate in disparities in
outcomes” when utilizing algorithmic risk assessment tools); see generally Ngozi Okidegbe, The
Democratizing Potential of Algorithms?, 53 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (discussing how pretrial
risk assessment algorithms are racially exclusive).
5
For just one of many examples of this liminality, see Angelina N. McDonald, In Search of a
Standard of Review: Decisions to Forcibly Medicate Pre-Trial Detainees in Light of Riggins v. Nevada,
72 U. CIN. L. REV. 285, 286, 295–96 (2003) (noting that Riggins, a case where a defendant was ordered
to continue Mellaril—an antipsychotic drug—during trial involuntarily, “does not provide a standard by
which to review the forced medication of pre-trial detainees, particularly those that have not been proven
a danger to themselves or others, and that the decision to forcibly medicate both dangerous and
non-dangerous pre-trial detainees should be reviewed under strict scrutiny”).
6
New in the sense that the same problems discussed above are framed in a different light, raising
novel concerns and arguments about old issues.
7
932 F.3d 79 (Boustani II) (2d Cir. 2019).
8
Id. at 82.

2021]

“LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL”

477

light of the presumption of innocence. Using this backdrop, this Note will
argue that detaining wealthy individuals who can afford certain conditions
to avoid disparate treatment is actually a detriment to indigent defendants.
By leveling down, more defendants are detained in contravention of the
original purpose of the Bail Reform Act. Instead, this Note will explore the
language of the Bail Reform Act to argue for a level up to allow more
individuals to be released, regardless of wealth. One way in which this Note
will engage with the idea of release and detention is by using Jeffrey
Epstein’s detention as a case study.9 His case exemplifies the tension within
the Boustani II opinion10 and serves as a starting point for what this change
in bail reform could look like.11
In order to do so, this Note will utilize language within the Bail Reform
Act to argue for an expansion of release. This Note will explore several
interpretations of the term “least restrictive” in § 3142(c)(1)(B) of the Bail
Reform Act. These different approaches all lead to the same result: utilizing
the flexibility of the term in order to strike back at the inequity within the
pretrial justice system. First, this Note will read “least restrictive” together
with the purpose of the Bail Reform Act to argue for release of both wealthy
and indigent defendants.12 Next, this Note will argue for a practical reading
of the term “least restrictive,” especially in the age of “e-carceration.”13
Finally, this Note will look at “least restrictive” in a larger societal context
and with emphasis on the important role that federal bail reform plays in the
criminal justice system.
These arguments create a return to the presumption of release embedded
within the Bail Reform Act. There are nearly 500,000 pretrial individuals in

9
There are, of course, defendants similar to Epstein who have been released. A recent notable case
is Fotis Dulos, a real estate developer in Connecticut arrested and charged with capital murder, murder,
and kidnapping. He was released on a $6 million bond. He then committed suicide, stating in his suicide
note that he refused to spend another minute in jail despite being innocent. Dulos’s case is an important
foil to Epstein’s. Juxtaposing these cases highlights that a defendant’s release or detention does not
always ensure a trial, or justice. This serves as an important reminder that pretrial detention is not a
component of getting justice; it reminds us that pretrial detention is administrative and does not always
do what it is designed to do: ensure appearance at trial and minimize harm to the community. For more
information on the Fotis Dulos case, see Emily Shapiro & Aaron Katersky, Fotis Dulos Arrested for
Murder of Estranged Wife Jennifer Dulos, ABC NEWS (Jan. 7, 2020, 4:36 PM), https://abcnews.go.co
m/US/fotis-dulos-arrested-murder-case-missing-connecticut-mom/story?id=68116764; Emily Shapiro,
Fotis Dulos Released on Bond in Jennifer Dulos Murder Case, ABC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2020, 12:56 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/fotis-dulos-released-bond-jennifer-dulos-murder-case/story?id=68168186;
Mola Lenghi, Fotis Dulos Denies Killing Estranged Wife in Suicide Note, CBS NEWS, (Feb. 1, 2020,
7:36 PM) https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fotis-dulos-news-ct-man-denies-killing-estranged-wifejennifer-dulos-in-suicide-note-defends-michelle-troconis/.
10
It is arguably the entire reason for the Boustani II opinion. See infra pp. 482–85.
11
This Note is not advocating that Epstein should have been released; rather that the bail conditions
that he proposed, and their potential mitigating factors, can serve as examples for the future.
12
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2018).
13
See infra Part IV.
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United States jails each day,14 but drafting notes reflect that the Bail Reform
Act was supposed to decrease the amount of pretrial detainees favoring
release.15 There is a rebuttable presumption for detention only for “a small
but identifiable group of particularly dangerous defendants as to whom
neither the imposition of stringent release conditions nor the prospect of
revocation of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or
other persons.”16 But even this presumption for detention for certain offenses
“can easily be rebutted.”17 And importantly, at this stage of the criminal trial,
criminal defendants are still presumed innocent.18 For the presumption of
innocence to mean anything, there must be a presumption of release, with
detention only under specific circumstances.19 Without it, there is a risk that
pretrial detention can morph into a determination of punishment without
trial.20 This Note reestablishes this presumption for release through a
reexamination of the Bail Reform Act.
This Note will not discuss money bail.21 Money bail is mainly utilized
within the state systems, which are not governed by the Bail Reform Act. In
the federal system, the Bail Reform Act allows courts to release individuals
either on personal recognizance, unsecured bonds, or forfeiture bonds,
14
Why We Need Pretrial Reform, PRETRIAL JUST. INST., https://www.pretrial.org/getinvolved/learn-more/why-we-need-pretrial-reform/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2019); see also Onyekwere,
supra note 1.
15
See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (authorizing release on personal recognizance “unless the judicial officer
determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will
endanger the safety of any other person or the community”) (emphasis added). But see Shima Baradaran,
Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 752 (2011) (“As intended, the 1984 Bail
Reform Act was effective in increasing pretrial detention.”) [hereinafter Baradaran, Restoring the
Presumption of Innocence]. As codified, the Bail Reform Act does not state a clear purpose either for or
against release. Infra page 251.
16
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6–7 (1983).
17
James R. Marsh, Reducing Unnecessary Detention: A Goal or Result of Pretrial Services?, 65
FED. PROB. 16, 16 (2001). This presumption also only applies when a judicial officer finds it applies; it
is not statutorily required. Id.
18
See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed as modifying or limiting the
presumption of innocence.”).
19
See Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, supra note 15, at 746–54 (discussing
the Bail Reform Act’s new concept of release based on community safety and allowance of guilt-based
determinations).
20
See id. at 752–54 (explaining how at least one court based its detention determination on a finding
that the defendant was guilty rather than the risk of his nonappearance or danger to the community).
21
The Bail Reform Act specifically uses the term “release” to distinguish from money bond. See S.
REP. NO. 98-225, supra note 16, at 4 (“Instead of using the term ‘bail’, this provision and other provisions
in this chapter use the term ‘release’ in order to distinguish between money bond (i.e., ‘bail’) and
conditional release (often referred to as ‘release on bail’).”). And the Bail Reform Act itself expressly
prevents imposition of “a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(c)(2). Money bail in state systems is a massive problem, leading to painful divisions between
wealthy and indigent defendants. Just like the federal system, the impact of money bail goes beyond
affecting the poor; it bleeds into society as a whole. For an in-depth look at the relationship between
money bail and poverty, one facet of how money bail affects society, see generally BERNADETTE RABUY
& DANIEL KOPF, PRISON POLICY INSTITUTE, DETAINING THE POOR: HOW MONEY BAIL PERPETUATES
AN ENDLESS CYCLE OF POVERTY AND JAIL TIME (2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/Detaini
ngThePoor.pdf.
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which are only seized upon the individual’s failure to appear, as well as bail
bonds.22 While money can be a barrier for release at either the state or federal
level, the Bail Reform Act specifically prohibits money from preventing
release, unlike the state money bail systems.23 This Note instead focuses on
other barriers to release involving money that arise in the federal system,
specifically the ability to pay for certain mitigating conditions, because the
Bail Reform Act is here to stay.24
Part I explores Jeffrey Epstein’s bail package and tie decision in United
States v. Boustani. Part II looks at the current state of the law surrounding
pretrial detention. Part III briefly looks at the problem of inequity in the
pretrial system. Part IV, in three subparts, provides the three different lenses,
purposeful, practical, and societal, for reassessing the Bail Reform Act. The
last part concludes.
I. A TWO-TIERED SYSTEM
On July 6, 2019, Jeffrey Epstein was arrested and charged with sex
trafficking.25 His lawyers prepared and argued a bond package, which
22

18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(b), (c)(1)(B)(xi)–(xii).
Id. at § 3141(c)(2) (“The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in the
pretrial detention of the person.”). See Beth A. Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement, 72
VAND. L. REV. 55, 77–80 (2019) (discussing the effect of parole and probation-based requirements on
the ability to vote and how wealth factors into systemic disenfranchisement).
24
In United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the Bail Reform Act
as constitutional. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). The Court, through Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected Anthony
Salerno’s argument that preventative detention was unconstitutional. First, the Court held that the Bail
Reform Act did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court noted that “the
Government’s regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an
individual’s liberty interest” such that it passed a facial challenge. Id. at 748, 752. By framing the issue
as such, the Court did not perceive detention as a form of conviction-free punishment. Second, the Court
held that the Act did not violate the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. It rejected an
argument “that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the government from pursuing other
admittedly compelling interests through regulation of pretrial release.” Id. at 753. The Court held that
“when Congress has mandated detention on the basis of a compelling interest other than prevention of flight
[i.e., danger to the community] . . . the Eighth Amendment does not require release on bail.” Id. at 754–55.
This is an astonishing statement. Justice Marshall’s powerful and eloquent dissent points out that
under the majority’s logic, reductio ad absurdum, Congress can justify sweeping regulations that infringe
upon individual freedom by simply stating it is attempting to regulate and protect, not punish. Id. at 760
(Marshall, J., dissenting). While Justice Marshall’s call-out of the majority’s fallacy remains true, the
constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act and the implications of Salerno are now beyond question. The
current question is how to prevent Justice Marshall’s horrifying regulatory state from becoming a reality.
Now, ironically, Salerno serves as a potential pathway to challenge state and local money bail
systems; reformers challenging state and local municipal challenges can use the rhetoric and logic from
Salerno to raise substantive due process arguments even though Salerno itself did not directly engage in
this analysis. For more information on this use of Salerno and the role of the federal courts in deciding
the constitutionality of state and local bail systems, see Kellen Funk, The Present Crisis in American
Bail, 128 YALE L.J.F. 1098, 1104–08 (2019).
25
Patricia Mazzei & William K. Rashbaum, Jeffrey Epstein, Financier Long Accused of Molesting
Minors, is Charged, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/06/nyregion/jeffreyepstein-arrested-sex-trafficking.html. Epstein was specifically charged with two counts of sex trafficking
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a), (b)(2), conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, and sex trafficking of minors,
23
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included home detention, electronic monitoring, an extradition waiver, a
bond secured by Epstein’s $77 million Manhattan home, his private jet, his
brother’s West Palm Beach mortgage, a friend’s investment interests on two
properties, a grant for pretrial and government services to randomly access
his house, scheduled reporting to pretrial services, a prohibition on anyone
other than Epstein and his attorneys entering the home, a trustee or trustees
living with him, and more.26 Because Epstein’s charges involved trafficking
of minor victims, there was a rebuttable presumption for his detention
mandated by the Bail Reform Act.27
On July 18, 2019, Epstein’s bail was denied.28 In a detailed order, Judge
Berman of the District Court for the Southern District of New York found that
Epstein was both a danger to the community29 and a flight risk.30 Judge Berman
then found that the proposed bail package was not enough to rebut the
presumption of detention.31 Notably, the court stated that “[t]he defense bail
package proposes excessive involvement of the Court in routine aspects of Mr.
Epstein’s proposed home confinement. This is not the Court’s function.”32
For Epstein’s bail package to be successful, he needed to rebut the
presumptions of both flight and danger; rebutting one is not enough under
the Bail Reform Act. The crux of Epstein’s case, as noted by Judge Berman,
was danger to the community prong.33 Epstein’s history and characteristics,
including his vast fortune34 as well as the seriousness of the offense, weighed
strongly against him.
Yet there is a strong argument that Epstein’s bail package mitigated his
risk of flight by the required preponderance of the evidence. Epstein’s
package mandated: 24/7-armed security guards, electronic monitoring, a
trustee in the home with him, daily check-ins with probation, cameras
mounted at the front and rear entrances, a waiver of rights against
which triggered the rebuttable presumption of the Bail Reform Act. Indictment at 11–12, United States
v. Epstein, No. 1:19-cr-00490-RMB (S.D.N.Y. July 02, 2019), ECF No. 2.
26
Letter Motion at 3–4, United States v. Epstein, No. 1:19-cr-00490-RMB (S.D.N.Y. July 11,
2019), ECF No. 6 [hereinafter Epstein Bail Package].
27
18 U.S.C § 3142(e). See also Epstein Bail Package, supra note 26, at 5 (explaining that the
rebuttable presumption only shifts the burden of production to the defendant, with the government
retaining the ultimate burden of persuasion).
28
Benjamin Weiser & Ali Watkins, Jeffrey Epstein is Denied Bail in Sex Crimes Case, N.Y. TIMES
(July 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com.2019/07/18/nyregion/jeffrey-epstein-bail-hearing.html.
29
Decision & Order Remanding Defendant at 10–21, United States v. Epstein, No. 1:19-cr-00490RMB (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2019), ECF No. 32 [hereinafter Epstein Order].
30
Id. at 21–28.
31
Id. at 29.
32
Id. at 30 (citing United States v. Zarrab, 15 Cr 867 (RMB), 2016 WL 3681423, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
June 16, 2016)).
33
Id. at 10 (“The Court begins with ‘dangerousness’ because that concept is at the heart of this
case.”); Transcript of Bail Decision hearing at 3:6–8, United States v. Epstein, No. 1:19-cr-00490-RMB
(S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2019), ECF No. 40 (“I think it is fair to say that it is the heart of this decision, that is
to say, dealing with danger to the others and to the community.”).
34
His defense counsel represented his total assets to be $559,120,954. Epstein Order, supra note
29, at 5.
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extradition, requiring him to turn in his passport and restricting him from
applying for another, and demobilizing all means of transportation.35 Each
of these conditions cuts against fears of Epstein absconding by essentially
creating a private prison. Despite his vast wealth, the court-controlled
aspects of this package, such as the electronic monitoring, trustee, bonds,
random check-ins, and “[a]ny other condition the Court deems necessary to
reasonably assure Mr. Epstein’s appearance,” together take away his power
to exercise his privileges to flee.36 Removing Epstein’s agency, despite his
fame and fortune, arguably rebuts the presumption of flight, despite his
history and characteristics and the severity of the crime.
Whether the bail package mitigates danger to the community is more
difficult. While the conditions above mitigate anyone’s leaving or entering
the property, there are other ways in which Epstein poses a threat to the
community. As the Government points out in its motion for detention,
Epstein had a history of witness intimidation.37 There was nothing in the
package that could reasonably prevent either Epstein or someone acting on
his behalf from harassing witnesses telephonically.38 This is where his bond
package failed to check his agency; no condition prevented him from
harassing witnesses from his home. But witness harassment remains a risk
even from prison. If he were to have harassed witnesses in this case, Epstein
would have likely used the exact same tactics of harassment from his home
or jail.39 And home detention with cameras at all entry and egress points, as
well as a trustee reporting to the court, mitigated any potential harm to
victims or potential targets by Epstein’s hand.
This is not to say that he should have been released; his history and
characteristics, the severity of the crimes, his lack of compliance with sex
offender requirements, and the presumption for detention all weigh strongly
against any potential mitigating conditions. But one thing that should not, in
this instance, have cut against his release was wealth. One of, if not the most,
common thread in the Government’s opposition and Judge Berman’s Order
was Epstein’s wealth. The court saw his wealth as opening up avenues for
escape and further harm. But as Epstein’s attorneys pointed out in their
motion for pretrial release, “the Bail Reform Act . . . authorizes release for

35

Epstein Bail Package, supra note 26, at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
37
Letter Motion at 11, United States v. Epstein, No. 1:19-cr-00490-RMB (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2019),
ECF No. 11.
38
The Government notes in its motion that this had happened in Epstein’s previous case. Id.
39
Chiefly, recruiting someone else to threaten witnesses. See VERA INST. OF JUST., PROSECUTING
WITNESS TAMPERING, BAIL JUMPING, AND BATTERING FROM BEHIND BARS 3–5 (2006),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/Publications/prosecuting-witness-tampering-bail-jumping-andbattering-from-behind-bars/legacy_downloads/Prosecuting.pdf (detailing the depth and pervasiveness of
witness intimidation and tampering from behind bars in domestic violence cases). See also supra note 38
(noting the witness harassment in Epstein’s prior case).
36

482

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:2

even wealthy defendants facing serious charges who travel and own property
abroad.”40 His attorneys have a point.41
Yet on August 1, 2019, a week after Epstein’s appeal, the Second Circuit
issued United States v. Boustani.42 The decision was almost certainly
targeted at Epstein; the Second Circuit had already affirmed the Eastern
District of New York’s order to detain Jean Boustani, a wealthy defendant
found to be a flight risk, on May 16, 2019.43 The timing of the issuance of
this opinion and the clear effect that it had on Epstein’s appeal indicate that
the Second Circuit seemed to be preempting any arguments for wealth
discrimination that would be raised on appeal.44
Jean Boustani is “a wealthy international businessman . . . . [and] a
citizen of Lebanon, Antigua, and Barbuda and has no ties to the United
States.”45 He was arrested while en route to the Dominican Republic and
charged “in connection with a $ 2 billion fraud, bribery, and money
laundering scheme.”46 Before a magistrate judge, he proposed a bail
application of $2 million cash and a bond amount to be determined by the
court.47 The magistrate judge found that Boustani “failed to present credible
sureties to ensure his appearance and the safety of the community,” and so
he was detained.48 Boustani subsequently appealed his decision to the
district court.49 His new bail package included: a $20 million personal
recognizance bond with $1 million in cash, surrendering all of his and his
wife’s travel documents, supervision by pretrial services, home confinement
with GPS monitoring secured by Guidepost Solutions, twenty-four hour
armed former or off-duty law enforcement officers with two officers per
shift, limiting visitors, and a consent to use of force.50 The court found that
despite the package and Boustani’s assertion that it would be “impossible . . .
to flee,”51 he was a flight risk. In part of its finding that there was no set of
conditions that would reasonably assure Boustani’s appearance in court, the
district court noted that “although this Defendant has vast financial resources
to construct his own ‘private prison,’ the Court is not convinced ‘disparate
40

Epstein Bail Package, supra note 26, at 2.
The Bail Reform Act does allow the courts to consider “financial resources” as part of a
defendant’s history and characteristics. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A).
42
Boustani II, 932 F.3d 79, 79 (2d Cir. 2019).
43
Id. at 80.
44
See Dan Mangan, Jeffrey Epstein’s Long-Shot Bid to Get Bail for Child Sex Traffic Case Just
Got Tougher Because of New Appeals Court Decision, CNBC: POLITICS (Aug. 1, 2019, 4:02 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/01/jeffrey-epstein-bid-for-bail-in-sex-case-hurt-by-appeals-ruling.html
(discussing the effect of Boustani II on Epstein’s appeal).
45
United States v. Boustani (Boustani I), 356 F. Supp. 3d. 246, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 250.
51
Id. at 251 (emphasis omitted).
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treatment based on wealth is permissible under the Bail Reform Act.’”52 The
district court focused on what it believed would be disparate treatment between
a wealthy individual who could mitigate his flight risk through conditions he
paid for, including security guards, and an indigent defendant who would be
detained because of an inability to pay for these mitigating conditions.53
On appeal, Boustani challenged the idea that no conditions could
mitigate the finding that he was a flight risk, not the actual finding that he
was a flight risk.54 In May 2019, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court by order. Two months later, and again, one week after Epstein’s appeal
of his detention, the Second Circuit issued a full opinion “to explain that
decision and to clarify the circumstances under which the Bail Reform Act
permits a district court to release a defendant pending trial pursuant to a
condition under which the defendant would pay for private armed security
guards.”55 The Second Circuit explicitly rejected the concept of “a
two-tiered bail system in which defendants of lesser means are detained
pending trial while wealthy defendants are released to self-funded private
jails.”56 Judge José A. Cabranes, author of the Boustani II opinion, noted
that:
It is a fundamental principle of fairness that the law protects
“the interests of rich and poor criminals in equal scale, and its
hand extends as far to each.” To interpret the Bail Reform Act
as requiring district courts to permit wealthy defendants to
employ privately funded armed guards where an otherwise
similarly situated defendant without means would be detained
would violate this core principle.57
The language of the Boustani II opinion extends far beyond the capacity
to pay for armed guards. It expresses the concern for “granting bail to
defendants because of their wealth.”58 The idea being that releasing
defendants on conditions that they can afford because of their wealth creates
a disparate effect between them and indigent defendants.59 The finding that
no set of conditions could assure Boustani’s appearance was, in part, based
upon the court’s desire to avoid disparate treatment between Boustani and
his codefendants.60
52

Id. at 258 (quoting United States v. Bruno, 89 F. Supp. 3d 425, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)).
Id. (citing United States v. Esposito, 749 F. App’x 20, 24 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order)).
54
Boustani II, 932 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2019).
55
Id. at 80.
56
Id. at 82.
57
Id. (citation omitted).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 83; see also Boustani I, 356 F. Supp. 3d. 246, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“Although courts in
this jurisdiction have permitted private jail solutions where there was no possibility one ‘defendant might
be detained while a wealthy defendant could be released with a private guard solution,’ Defendant’s
release could very well produce disparate treatment based on wealth, as other co-defendants may not
53
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The only exception that the Boustani II court carved out is “where the
defendant is deemed to be a flight risk primarily because of his wealth.”61 This
loops back to United States v. Sabhnani, where the Second Circuit held that
defendants of means could not be designated as flight risks because of their
resources where indigent defendants would most likely have been released.62
The Sabhnani court purposefully did not address “whether it would be ‘contrary
to principles of detention and release on bail’ to allow wealthy defendants ‘to
buy their way out by constructing a private jail.’”63 The Boustani II court
carefully noted that courts cannot detain individuals where “but for” their wealth
they would have been released in the spirit of Sabhnani.64
The ramifications of Boustani II go beyond Jeffrey Epstein. What the
Second Circuit has essentially held is that individuals who are otherwise
releasable will now be detained because of their wealth, despite the
exception the court carved out to prevent individuals from being detained
because of their wealth as in Sabhnani. The consequence of the Boustani II
logic is that even if conditions that can be purchased would mitigate
detention for a wealthy individual, they must be detained because they can
afford those conditions, while indigent defendants cannot. Because of their
wealth, certain criminal defendants are able to create bail packages that
mitigate a finding of either flight or danger; under the Bail Reform Act, they
are thus releasable.65 The Second Circuit instead focused on the disparate
impact this path—the one explicitly authorized by the Bail Reform Act—
would have. Section 3142(c)(1) says that a “judicial officer shall order the
pretrial release . . . (B) subject to the least restrictive further condition, or
combination of conditions, that such judicial officer determines will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of
. . . the community.”66 The Bail Reform Act mandates release when there
are conditions that afford it, even if it leads to the disparate effects the
Boustani II court feared. And the Bail Reform Act mandates that this be done
under the “least restrictive” conditions possible.67
The Second Circuit correctly noted that the Bail Reform Act was not meant
to be a tool to further disenfranchisement or wealth-based discrimination or
disparities.68 But the court’s reasoning and result also cut against the purpose of
the Bail Reform Act by now detaining people who can propose and afford bail
currently possess the financial capacity to pay for the private jail solution Defendant requests.” (citation
omitted)).
61
Boustani II, 932 F.3d at 82.
62
United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 78 n.18 (2d Cir. 2007) (“We note, however, that in the
instant case, defendants of lesser means, lacking the resources to flee, might have been granted bail in
the first place.”).
63
Id. (citation omitted).
64
Boustani II, 932 F.3d at 82.
65
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B).
66
Id. (emphasis added).
67
Id. (emphasis added).
68
Boustani II, 932 F.3d at 82.
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packages that “reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and
the safety of any other person and the community.”69
These two cases create and illuminate the tension between bail decisions
and wealth; Boustani II specifically creates the problem that this Note seeks
to address. How can the Bail Reform Act be read in order to maximize
release for all defendants, irrespective of wealth?
II. LAW GOVERNING THE PRETRIAL DETENTION PROCESS
It is worthwhile to first explain how pretrial detention works and what
judges consider when deciding whether to detain someone. First, a defendant
must be released if the court finds that a personal recognizance or unsecured
bond is enough to ensure the defendant’s appearance at trial.70 There is no
finding of flight risk or danger to the community needed; § 3142(b)
mandates release just on personal recognizance or unsecured bond.71 It is
only if the court finds that the defendant is a flight risk or a danger to the
community where additional conditions are warranted.72 But there is still a
presumption for release because § 3142(c) says that if a personal
recognizance or unsecured bond is not enough to mitigate flight risk or
danger to the community, the “judicial officer shall order the pretrial release
of the person” subject to conditions.73
In the Boustani I district court opinion, the court describes the analysis
under the Bail Reform Act:
A district court undertakes a two-step inquiry when evaluating
an application for bail. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). First, the
Court must determine whether the Government has
established the defendant presents a danger to the community
or a risk of flight. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). Second, if the
Government meets its initial burden, the Court must determine
whether no conditions or combination of conditions of release
could reasonably assure the defendant will not flee or will not
endanger others. See United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63,
75 (2d Cir. 2007).74
To make this determination, § 3142(g) provides factors the factors the
court considers: the nature and circumstances of the offense; the weight of
the evidence; the defendant’s history and characteristics, including family
69

18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B).
Id. § 3142(a)–(b).
71
Id. § 3142(b) (mandating release on personal recognizance “unless the judicial officer determines
that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the
safety of any other person or the community”).
72
Id. § 3142(c).
73
Id.
74
Boustani I, 356 F. Supp. 3d. 246, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
70
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ties to the area, employment, finances, past conduct, substance abuse,
criminal history, and prior probation violations; and the danger to the
community if the defendant were released.75 Because courts are not bound
by the rules of evidence for bail determinations, they can also consider
information provided by proffer and uncharged conduct.76 The categories of
flight risk and danger to the community have different standards of proof.
The court must find that the conditions mitigate a danger to the community
by clear and convincing evidence,77 whereas it finds the conditions mitigate
a flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence.78
Under §§ 3142(e)(2) and (e)(3), there are rebuttable presumptions when
“no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety
of any other person and the community”79 and when the defendant is charged
with narcotics and firearms charges.80 These categories also help determine
whether the defendant is a flight risk (as a previous violator) or a danger to
the community (based upon the charge).81 In rebuttable presumption cases,
“a defendant bears a limited burden of production—not a burden of
persuasion—to rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence
that he does not pose a danger to the community or a risk of flight.”82 The
rebuttable presumption then becomes a factor that the court weighs along
with the others under § 3142(g), and the government bears the ultimate
burden of persuasion that the defendant is a a flight risk or danger to the
community by the respective standards of proof.83 This means the defendant
could still be detained even after successfully rebutting the presumption.84
Section 3142(f) contains a defendant’s pretrial procedural rights. It
includes the right to representation, an opportunity to testify, present
witnesses, cross-examine, and proffer information, not covered by the rules
of evidence.85 A defendant detained by a magistrate judge may appeal the
decision to a district judge and may request permission for an interlocutory
appeal to appeal the bail decision to a circuit court.86 Sections 3145(b) and

75
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); U.S. CTS., ORDER OF DETENTION PENDING TRIAL (2016) [hereinafter Form
AO 472], https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ao472.pdf.
76
See United States v. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1991) (rejecting the requirement of a
nexus between the charge and the conduct for it to be considered during the bail hearing).
77
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).
78
Boustani I, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 251.
at 251.
79
Form AO 472, supra note 75, at pt. II(A).
80
Id. at pt. II(B).
81
Id. at pt. II(A)–(B).
82
United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001).
83
Id.
84
Form AO 472, supra note 75, at pt. II(C) (“The defendant has presented evidence sufficient to
rebut the presumption, but after considering the presumption and the other factors discussed below,
detention is warranted.”).
85
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
86
18 U.S.C. § 3145(b)–(c).
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(c) govern the appellate rights that a detained defendant has, including
expedited review.87
Historically, pretrial detention was meant to ensure appearance at trial.88
This ideology began to shift with the emergence of the 1966 Bail Reform
Act.89 Although there was still a presumption for release in noncapital cases,
the 1966 Bail Reform Act introduced the concept of weighing the evidence
against the defendant in order to determine release.90 The 1984 Bail Reform
Act capitalized on this concept and shifted the presumption for release only
when the defendant’s “presence at trial could be reasonably guaranteed.”91
But the 1984 Bail Reform Act does not actually have the purpose or
requirement to prevent or reduce unnecessary pretrial detention.92 Yet the
Senate Report notes “[t]he decision to provide for pretrial detention is in no
way a derogation of the importance of the defendant’s interest in remaining
at liberty prior to trial.”93 The idea of preventative detention is “that a
defendant’s interest in remaining free prior to conviction is, in some
circumstances, outweighed by the need to protect societal interests,”94
namely the risk of flight and danger to the community.
Pretrial detention is covered by the Constitution, but in a confused
manner. It falls somewhere between the protections of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
and Eighth Amendments.95 The Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno
held that the Bail Reform Act did not facially violate the Due Process Clause
or the Excessive Bail Clause.96 The Court did not explicitly address
substantive due process, but Professor Kellan Funk advocates for a strong
reading of Salerno, meaning the safeguards that the Salerno court found
sufficient to uphold the Act are a floor; he uses this to argue that “[b]ecause
substantive due process analysis turns on the fundamental nature of the right
involved—pretrial liberty and its related rights to prepare a defense and be
presumed innocent pending trial—an unaffordable bail amount may trigger
heightened procedures even if the defendant is relatively wealthy.”97
87

Id.
Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, supra note 15, at 728–34. Even Salerno
recognizes that flight is the core of pretrial bail. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 753 (1987)
(“While we agree that a primary function of bail is to safeguard the courts’ role in adjudicating the guilt
or innocence of defendants, we reject the proposition that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits
the government from pursuing other admittedly compelling interests through regulation of pretrial
release.”).
89
Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, supra note 15, at 739–45.
90
Id. at 739–40.
91
Id. at 747 (citation omitted).
92
Marsh, supra note 17, at 16.
93
S. REP. NO. 98-225, supra note 16, at 7.
94
Id. (emphasis added).
95
Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1009, 1014–18
(2013). It should also be noted that at the state level, the Fourteenth Amendment would also be
implicated, but because this Note only focuses on federal pretrial detention, it is irrelevant here.
96
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987).
97
Funk, supra note 2424, at 1107–08.
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While there are standards for police treatment during an arrest and
standards for the treatment of sentenced criminals, there is a gap regarding
the standards for treating pretrial detainees.98 The Salerno court found that
pretrial detention is not penal but administrative in nature.99 This is based
upon Bell v. Wolfish.100 In Bell, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that punishment of pretrial detainees is unacceptable, but any other
treatment, as long as it is reasonably related to a legitimate government
purpose, is allowed.101 This has splintered into various approaches to claims,
depending upon the time in detention, relating pretrial detention either closer
to the arrest and Fourth Amendment context or the Eighth Amendment
punishment context.102 It is understood “that at some point after arrest and
prior to trial, the Fourth Amendment’s protections cease and substantive due
process principles begin to govern the treatment of pretrial detainees.”103 So
while it is clear and indisputable that pretrial detainees are covered by the
Constitution, the boundaries of their rights are hazy.
The interaction between these rights and the government’s interest in the
safety of the community and in fair adjudication drives the need for a
case-by-case assessment. Because of the compelling balance of interests at
stake, “courts must be vigilant not to unduly rely upon a proffer of a set of
accusations and weighty evidence in support thereof to substantiate an order
of pretrial detention.”104 This requires “a careful balancing of all of the
relevant factors . . . to ensur[e] that not even one defendant is unnecessarily
deprived of her interest in liberty pending trial, all while protecting the
community at large, and, by extension, ensuring the integrity of and respect
for the criminal system.”105
III. INEQUALITY AND INEQUITY AT THE PRETRIAL LEVEL
The Second Circuit’s Boustani II decision quickly received backlash
because of the court’s leveling down approach.106 Boustani II’s approach
98

Struve, supra note 95, at 1014–18.
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746–47.
100
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 530–43 (1979); see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746–47 (citing to Bell).
101
Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (“A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of
punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.”); see also
Struve, supra note 95, at 1014–18 (discussing Wolfish and the ambiguity the decision created).
102
See Struve, supra note 95, at 1018–32 (tracing the different ways lower courts have approached
and decided detention cases).
103
Id. at 1023.
104
United States v. Paulino, 335 F. Supp. 3d 600, 603–04 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
105
Id. at 604.
106
See Catherine Foti, All Defendants Are Created Equal Under the Bail Reform Act—Or Are
They?, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2019, 2:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2019/08/14/alldefendants-are-created-equal-under-the-bail-reform-act-or-are-they/#7a768f604262 (arguing that the
Bail Reform Act is inherently inequitable, meaning the Boustani II court thus misconstrued the Act);
Alexander Klein, 2nd Circ.’s Approach to Bail Is Backward, LAW360 (Aug. 4, 2019, 8:02 PM)
https://www.law360.com/articles/1184921/2nd-circ-s-approach-to-bail-is-backward (noting that the
“least restrictive” condition should have been met through hiring armed guards and the outcome is now
99
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means that wealthy defendants who are otherwise releasable must be
detained in order to prevent “a two-tiered system.”107
The inequality problem here is the reverse of what is found in the state
money-bail systems. In the state systems, many indigent defendants are
detained because they cannot afford bail, thus being detained because of
their wealth, or lack thereof.108 The Boustani II court explicitly held that in
the federal system, wealthy defendants can be detained because of their
wealth: “A similarly situated defendant of lesser means surely would be
detained pending trial, and Boustani is not permitted to avoid such a result
by relying on his own financial resources to pay for a private jail.”109
The equality problem that Boustani II creates is that wealthy and
indigent defendants are now being treated differently solely because of
wealth. This is a problem on both sides. On one, individuals are being
detained when they might otherwise be releasable solely because of their
wealth. On the other, indigent individuals might be detained just because
they cannot afford to create their own “private jails.” Both scenarios are
problematic. The aim should be “rising all boats rather than sinking them.”110
Under Boustani II, wealth has now become the rate-limiting factor
despite the language of the Bail Reform Act.111 There is obviously a problem
with treating individuals differently because of their wealth, whether rich or
poor. But in this instance, disparate treatment of the wealthy leads to
inequity for all. This is because the word “shall” is now being taken
suggestively.112 As written in § 3142(c)(1)(B), if the judicial officer finds
that flight risk and danger to the community have been mitigated, they
“shall” release the defendant.113 Under Boustani II, courts can now refuse
release, despite this “shall” language, for whatever larger, societal, moral
reason the court may find. This broad discretion is a huge blow to the Bail
Reform Act, making its mandates mere suggestions.

that an individual is detained because of his wealth). See supra Part I for a discussion of the Boustani II case.
107
Boustani II, 932 F.3d. 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2019).
108
See Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth
Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1301 (2012) (telling the story of a New Jersey barber who
could not afford $1,000 bail and was murdered in detention); Cherise Fanno Burdeen, The Dangerous
Domino Effect of Not Making Bail, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/arc
hive/2016/04/the-dangerous-domino-effect-of-not-making-bail/477906/ (showing that nine out of ten
individuals detained pretrial are detained because they cannot post bond).
109
Boustani II, 932 F.3d. at 83.
110
Klein, supra note 106.
111
“The Bail Reform Act requires a defendant-specific analysis that is unavoidably inequitable.”
Foti, supra note 106.
112
“Shall,” in the legal context, is often understood to be mandatory. Bryan Garner, Shall We
Abandon Shall?, ABA J. (Aug. 1, 2012, 7:20 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/shall
_we_abandon_shall. But it has not always been interpreted as such. See Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760 (2005) (“We do not believe that these provisions of Colorado law [stating
that police “shall” act in certain ways] truly made enforcement of restraining orders mandatory.”).
113
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B).
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There is a large problem with releasing wealthy defendants while
indigent defendants remain locked up.114 But there is also a problem with
detaining individuals presumed innocent because of their wealth. This is
where “least restrictive” can be seen as the key to release for both wealthy
and indigent defendants alike.
This Note fits into a larger scheme of recent work in bail reform. As
pretrial detention rates increase, more scholars are diverting their focus
specifically to the assessment of defendants and findings of flight or
dangerousness.115 A significant portion of pretrial bail scholarship is focused
on the cash bail system and the inequities it creates.116 Some focus on
criminology and the later effects of detention on the case outcome.117 But
discussions of release conditions and the overall role of bail are increasing
as well. That is where this Note fits in; this Note seeks to expand upon the
discussion of release conditions.
IV. “LEAST RESTRICTIVE” AS A KEY TO EQUALITY
Within the Bail Reform Act, the key to equalization lies within one
phrase: “least restrictive.”118 Tucked into the section on release conditions,
the phrase “least restrictive” imposes a requirement on judges for how they
shall release defendants. Under § 3142(c)(1)(B), a judge shall impose the
“least restrictive further condition[s]” on a defendant if the requirements in
§ 3142(b)119 do not mitigate findings of flight risk or danger to the
community. This is the crux of the Bail Reform Act’s flexibility. The

114
See Appleman, supra note 108, at 1299–1301 (discussing the dichotomy between the treatment
and release of wealthy defendants such as Martha Stewart, Bernie Madoff, Rod Blagojevich, and others
with the detention of a New Jersey barber for unpaid parking tickets and failure to register a new car).
115
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing scholarship on risk assessment).
116
See supra notes 3, 21 (discussing money bail); see also Stephanie Holmes Didwania, The
Immediate Consequences of Federal Pretrial Detention, 22 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 24, 24–25 (2020)
(commenting that most pretrial bail reform, including scholarship, is focused on money bail).
117
See Holmes Didwania, supra note 116, at 57 (finding “that federal pretrial detention appears to
significantly increase sentences, decrease the probability that a defendant will receive a below-Guidelines
sentence, and decrease the probability that they will avoid a mandatory minimum sentence if facing
one”); Meghan Sacks & Alissa R. Ackerman, Bail and Sentencing: Does Pretrial Detention Lead to
Harsher Punishment?, 25 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 59, 59, 70–72 (2012) (finding that pretrial detention
“significantly and negatively affects the length of the sentence”); Jacqueline G. Lee, To Detain or Not to
Detain? Using Propensity Scores to Examine the Relationship Between Pretrial Detention and
Conviction, 30 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 128, 146–50 (2019) (detailing the results of a study finding that
detention, independent from propensity scores, has an increased risk of a longer conviction in six counties
in Florida).
118
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B).
119
This section allows defendants to be released “on personal recognizance, or upon execution of
an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the court, subject to the condition that the
person not commit a Federal, State, or local crime during the period of release and subject to the condition
that the person cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample from the person if the collection of such a
sample is authorized pursuant to section 3 of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000. . . .”
18 U.S.C. § 3142(b).

2021]

“LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL”

491

conditions themselves120 are often key in the decision to detain or release.
This Note suggests several different ways to approach the same conclusion:
defendants should not be detained due to their wealth if they can be released.
It is easy to read the “defendant-specific analysis” of the Bail Reform Act as
“unavoidably inequitable.”121 But at the same time, the “defendant-specific
analysis” affords flexibility to the judicial official deciding whether to grant
or deny release.122 And if the Bail Reform Act is read in a way that favors
release, then this specific analysis can be tailored to allow for a wider range
of release based upon the conditions and what “least restrictive” means for
that specific defendant. This means wealth can be factored into and out of
the release calculus as needed, while not serving as the lynchpin for the
decision to release or detain.
First, the term “least restrictive” should be read in light of the original
purpose of pretrial detention, guaranteeing appearance at trial, while taking
into account the liberty-focused language of the Senate Report regarding the
1982 Bail Reform Act. Second, practical approaches about the Bail Reform
Act and pretrial detention process suggest that the ability to afford conditions
with independent money should not be a defining factor to release; the mere
ability to afford conditions should not be considered, while the conditions
themselves should. Finally, key societal concerns demonstrate that “least
restrictive” should be read in favor of release whenever any findings of flight
risk or danger to the community are mitigated, regardless of wealth.
A. A Purposeful Approach to Release
As originally enacted in 1966, the Bail Reform Act favored release.123
With the adoption of the 1984 Bail Reform Act and the category of “danger
to the community” came a shift in legislative purpose.124 One obvious way
to read “least restrictive” is in light of the presumption of innocence
contained within the Act with the intention of furthering release and the
original idea of detention only as a means to assure trial appearance.
“Least restrictive” lies in the eye of the judge. While the 1984 Bail
Reform Act is more strict than its predecessors, detention was still meant
120

See supra Part II for a discussion of the pretrial detention process and the role that conditions play.
Foti, supra note 106.
122
Id.
123
Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, supra note 15, at 739. Release before trial
was the norm before the 1980s. See id. at 728–39 (discussing historical understandings of the
presumption of innocence); Appleman, supra note 108, at 1323–35 (discussing the history of bail).
124
S. REP. NO. 98-225, supra note 16, at 3 (“The adoption of these changes marks a significant
departure from the basic philosophy of the Bail Reform Act, which is that the sole purpose of bail laws
must be to assure the appearance of the defendant at judicial proceedings.”). There is a large body of
scholarly work challenging the underlying assumption of this statement: recidivism. For instance, 49.7%
of prisoners released in 2005 “had either a parole or probation violation or an arrest for a new offense
within 3 years [of release] that led to imprisonment.” MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ALEXIA D. COOPER &
HOWARD N. SYNDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005:
PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010 1 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf.
121
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“[o]nly in rare circumstances . . . and doubts regarding the propriety of
release should be resolved in the defendant’s favor.”125 This rationale was
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v.
Salerno.126 But the Court noted that the Bail Reform Act’s preventative
detention was only meant for “the most serious of crimes.”127 The Salerno
Court used this factor to find that the Bail Reform Act did not violate
substantive due process, without using so many words.128
This language and rationale restore a purpose of release to the Bail Reform
Act. The Court’s rationale is rooted in the idea that “[i]n our society liberty is
the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited
exception.”129 The crux of the Court’s reading of constitutionality was based
upon the idea that pretrial detention was a limited option. By limiting
preventative detention to only rebuttable presumption cases, the Supreme
Court found the Bail Reform Act constitutional because it does not “deny []
the right to bail altogether.”130 This is because, in the Supreme Court’s
reading, the Bail Reform Act authorizes release for everyone except those who
committed offenses listed in § 3142(f). It is axiomatic that bail cannot be
altogether denied if it is supposed to be granted but for limited situations.
Yet modern courts are detaining more than ever. One of the key effects
of modern day pretrial detention is that it essentially serves as a
“mini-trial.”131 Judges are allowed to weigh the evidence against a defendant
in order to decide whether to release or detain.132 And the decision to detain

125

United States v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991).
481 U.S. 739; see also supra note 24.
127
Id. at 747 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). See also Funk, supra note 24, at 1105–07 (discussing the
Salerno Court’s reasoning).
128
Funk, supra note 24, at 1106 (“Salerno came right up to the precipice of engaging in a
substantive due process analysis without explicitly invoking those terms.”).
129
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755. But compare this to Justice Marshall’s fiery dissent, where he states
that the majority has allowed
126

a person innocent of any crime [to] be jailed indefinitely, pending the trial of
allegations which are legally presumed to be untrue, if the Government shows to the
satisfaction of a judge that the accused is likely to commit crimes, unrelated to the
pending charges, at any time in the future.
Id. at 755 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
130
Funk, supra note 24, at 1107.
131
See Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, supra note 15, at 752–54, 770–72
(detailing the advent of the weighing of the evidence as part of the 1984 Bail Reform Act and arguing as
part of her thesis that judges should not weigh the evidence, essentially determining guilt, in determining
bail). Some courts have minimized the importance that the weight of the evidence plays in the bail
determination because of these concerns. See United States v. Paulino, 335 F. Supp. 3d 600, 613
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“To avoid punishment for a crime for which a defendant ‘has not yet been shown to
have committed,’ many courts have suggested that the weight of the evidence is the least important of
the various factors.” (citations omitted)).
132
Form AO 472, supra note 7579, at Part II(C).
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has a domino effect on the rest of the criminal process.133 But, on principle,
judges “must be vigilant not to unduly rely upon a proffer of a set of
accusations and weighty evidence in support thereof to substantiate an order
of pretrial detention.”134 The rise of the finding of a danger to the community
and the rebuttable presumption for detention have shifted the burden away
from the Government to prove that “no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required
and the safety of any other person and the community.”135
The rise of modern detention can be linked to a shift in charging. As
Matthew Rowland, Chief of the Probation and Pretrial Services Office notes:
“The risk of flight and criminogenic profile of defendants in the federal
system has steadily worsened over the years, in part because of the focus of
federal prosecutions.”136 The shift to charging repeat offenders or the
offenses that were enumerated as serious crimes within the act, such as “drug
and human trafficking, violence, weapons, [and] sex crimes” correlates with
the rise of detention.137 What was meant to be detention in “rare
circumstances” has now become the norm.138
Because the focus of prosecutions has shifted, it is paramount that the
focus of the Bail Reform Act shifts. While the 1984 Bail Reform Act may
have been more restrictive than its predecessor, detention was not intended
to be the norm. In order to return to the norm of detention in only extreme
circumstances, a purposeful approach for release must be implemented. This
in turn helps to equalize the pretrial detention process. The criteria for
detention or release may be objective,139 but the demographics of those
detained are disproportional because of those who are being charged.
Returning to a purpose of release helps even this playing field and undoes
the damage of prosecutorial focus.
Equalizing release may come from a counterintuitive concept: release of
wealthy defendants. One major reason why there is such an inherent reaction
133
Stephanie Holmes Didwania conducted a survey across seventy-one federal jurisdictions and
discovered three ways in which pretrial detention affects sentencing. First, it can affect sentencing by
hindering a defendant’s ability to engage in their own defense. Second, released defendants can more
easily engage in post-offense rehabilitative efforts, which can be used for mitigation at sentencing. Third,
detained defendants may suffer representativeness bias as being more likely to recidivate than released
defendants. For more about her study, see Holmes Didwania, supra note 116116, at 25–26.
134
Paulino, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 604 (Carter, Jr., J.) (addressing, on remand from the Second Circuit,
his rationale for releasing the defendant and his perceptions of the standards within the Bail Reform Act).
135
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).
136
Rowland, supra note 2, at 18.
137
Id. Rowland also notes the shift in focus also includes illegal entry into the United States, but
this is outside the scope of the Bail Reform Act.
138
United States v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991). See also Rowland, supra note 2,
at 17 (noting that the § 3142(e) rebuttable presumption cases are “growing larger than the rule in favor
of release”).
139
But see Rowland, supra note 2, at 14 n.5 (“Note, not everyone considers the statutory factors to
be unbiased. Some civil rights organizations argue that factors such as prior failures to appear and rearrest
are more reflective of police and prosecutors’ decisions than the conduct of the defendants (Pretrial Justice).”).
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to the idea of releasing wealthy defendants based on conditions they can
afford is the idea they are being released to “a very expensive form of private
jail.”140 Courts have recently struggled with the idea that the conditions
necessary to release wealthy defendants have become so extensive that home
release has become another form of detention.141 Take for example United
States v. Valerio, where the court addressed “whether a defendant, if she is
able to perfectly replicate a private jail in her own home at her own cost, has
a right to do so under the Bail Reform Act and the United States
Constitution.”142 The issue is essentially: when do restrictions become more
than the “least restrictive” possible?
In light of the purpose of the Bail Reform Act, “least restrictive” actually
becomes quite expansive. There is nothing in the language of the Act to
restrict the conditions besides judicial discretion.143 There is a set list of
conditions that judicial officers can apply, but § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv) allows
for defendants to “satisfy any other condition that is reasonably necessary to
assure the appearance of the person as required and to assure the safety of
any other person and the community.”144 And judicial officers can apply
“any other condition that is reasonably necessary” in order to find the
defendant releasable.145 The Federal Probation and Pretrial Services Office
came up with a comprehensive list of conditions that can be imposing,
showing how defendant specific they can be.146 The issue raised in United
States v. Valerio takes effect when a judge imposes a laundry list of
conditions in order to ensure release.
Reading “least restrictive” in light of the purpose for release, “least
restrictive” becomes more of a requirement on fairness than quantity of
conditions. This means that to counterbalance the inequity of who is being
charged and detained, certain conditions can help shift the purpose of the
Act to focus on release. In response to the Valerio court’s concern, there is
nothing in the Bail Reform Act that says house arrest is not an acceptable
condition;147 the problem comes when wealth is added to the picture. “Least
restrictive” here does not mean a restriction on the conditions themselves.
140

United States v. Zarrab, 15 CR 867 (RMB), 2016 WL 3681423, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2016).
Id. (discussing the approaches in United States v. Banki, 369 F. App’x 152 (2d Cir. 2010) and
United States v. Valerio, 9 F. Supp. 3d 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)).
142
Valerio, 9 F. Supp. 3d, at 292.
143
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). If the restrictions in § 3142(b) are inadequate, a “judicial officer shall
order the pretrial release of the person . . . subject to the least restrictive further condition, or combination
of conditions, that such judicial officer determines will” mitigate flight or danger to the community.
144
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv).
145
Id.
146
See generally PROBAT. & PRETRIAL SERVS. OFFIC., ADMIN. OFFIC. OF THE U.S. CTS, OVERVIEW
OF PROBATION AND SPECIALIZED RELEASE CONDITIONS (2016), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/defau
lt/files/overview_of_probation_and_supervised_release_conditions_0.pdf [hereinafter PROBATION
CONDITIONS]. Some conditions are incredibly specific, including computer and internet restrictions,
gambling-related conditions, and restrictions on viewing sexually explicit materials, to name a few. Id.
147
See id. at 72–73 (listing home detention and home incarceration as type of location monitoring conditions).
141
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Instead, it is meant to be a low bar for judges in order to establish release
without unduly burdening defendants. One way to help ground this
perspective is to note that since the Federal Pretrial Services Act and of 1982
and the Bail Reform Act, both the number of individuals monitored and
detained have increased, even though they likely would have been released
prior to these acts.148
There is nothing specific within the Bail Reform Act that prevents
defendants from being placed under house arrest, even if the option is only
available because of the defendant’s wealth. While the Valerio court’s
concern is valid that the conditions themselves can become so restrictive,
they are akin to detention, that is not an affront to the Bail Reform Act.
“Least restrictive” in this context is a floor, not a ceiling; as long as the
conditions are such that they are the least that the judge finds mitigates any
finding of flight or danger, it is in line with the Act. And, in the imposition
of “least restrictive” conditions, judges “must be clear-eyed about the precise
risks they are trying to avoid or mitigate.”149
Because the Bail Reform Act should be read in light of a purpose to
release, bearing in mind the origin of pretrial detention, the release of
wealthy defendants should not be seen as inequitable. It instead should be
seen as an opportunity to further the release of all defendants, regardless of
wealth, by focusing on releasing all defendants through the imposition of
fair, and not overly burdensome, conditions.
B. A Practical Approach to Release
Another way to address pretrial release and wealth disparities is to
approach the Bail Reform Act practically. Reading “least restrictive” in a
practical, methodical way allows for the release of both wealthy and indigent
defendants, without harm to the other.
“Practical,” in this sense, means refocusing on the language of the Bail
Reform Act. “Least restrictive” practically means that defendants should be
released as long as there are conditions they can be released under. But even
before that, a practical reading means noting that this section of the Act does
not, and should not, even apply to all defendants. As noted above, the “least
restrictive” language only applies when there is first a finding of flight risk
or danger to the community.150 And even if the least restrictive requirement
applies, it is still under the presumption of release.151 To practically interpret
the Bail Reform Act would mean to read the language of the Act as written
and find that release is required if: (a) there are conditions that mitigate a
finding of flight risk or danger to the community; and (b) the charge does
148
James Byrne & Jacob Stowell, The Impact of the Federal Pretrial Services Act of 1982 on the
Release, Supervision, and Detention of Pretrial Defendants, 71 FED. PROB. 31, 32 (2007).
149
Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 677, 741 (2018).
150
See supra p. 453–55 (discussing how the Bail Reform Act functions).
151
See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1) (utilizing the term “shall” to mandate release).
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not fall under § 3141(f)(1). Courts have also held that in considering the
factors listed in determining mitigation in the Bail Reform Act,152 a “court
should bear in mind that it is only a ‘limited group of offenders’ who should
be denied bail pending trial.”153 Thus, a practical approach, one that most
closely models the language of the text, is one that allows for release for the
majority of defendants.
And even if a case falls under § 3142(f)(1), the language again asks
“whether any condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection
(c) of this section [where our “least restrictive” language is] will reasonably
assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other
person and the community.”154 While there is a higher hurdle in rebuttable
presumption cases, it is just a hurdle, not a bar to release.155 It again relies
upon whether there are conditions that mitigate flight risk or danger to the
community. And, even in rebuttable presumption cases, “[t]he Government
retains the ‘ultimate burden of persuasion’ that” the defendant is a flight risk
or danger to the community.156
This is all to say that allowing wealthy defendants to pay for conditions
is allowable by the Bail Reform Act if it mitigates a finding of flight risk or
danger to the community. There is a very strong case to say twenty-four-hour
home detention under watch by a security company approved by the
government would do so.157
In United States v. Tajideen, the District Court for the District of D.C.
specifically noted the defendant’s “financial means[,] even though some of
those funds may not be available to him” as a reason for concluding “that no
condition or combination of conditions would in fact ensure [the
defendant’s] appearance before this Court for future proceedings.”158 In its
analysis, the court focused on the fact that there was nothing to suggest that
a $2 million cash bond and posting the defendant’s brother’s home as
security “would impact [the defendant] sufficiently to ensure [his] presence
152

See supra pp. 485–87 (listing court’s analysis at this stage and the factors to be considered).
United States v. Shakur, 817 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, supra
note 16, at 7).
154
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
155
See Rowland, supra note 2, at 17 (relating that § 3142(e) is an exception now swallowing the
presumption for release). Rowland also cites studies that show “that the enumerated offenses [in §
3142(e)] may not be the best predictors of risk of flight or danger to the community.” Id.
156
Epstein Order, supra note 29, at 9 (citation omitted).
157
This option has been called “a magic pill” for release because of how it completely mitigates
fears of flight risk or danger to the community. Klein, supra note 106. For this option to actually be
“guaranteed release,” there needs to be no concern that the security company will look the other way if
a defendant slips out the back door. It may be in certain cases that the imposition of armed guards alone
is not enough because of this worry, or other conditions are more reliable. This, however, is beyond the
scope of this Note. This Note advocates not for one specific condition, but a reconsideration of the way
judges impose conditions.
158
United States v. Tajideen, No. 17-46 (RBW), 2018 WL 1342475, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2018)
(alterations in original).
153
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at trial” because of his vast resources.159 The court rejected the defendant’s
argument “that he should not be prevented from obtaining pretrial release
due to [his] wealth.”160 The court instead found “that permitting a vastly
wealthy defendant ‘to basically buy [his] way out of pretrial detention by
coming up with a plan consistent with what is being proposed here’ to be
wholly ‘inconsistent with [the purpose and] the reason for . . . the Bail
Reform Act . . . .’”161 Here, the court first used the defendant’s wealth to find
that he was a flight risk,162 then used his wealth to say that he should not be
allowed to buy his way out of detention. This means that the deciding factor
in Tajideen’s detention was his wealth.
That is not to say that Tajideen should have been released. In Tajideen’s
case, he was charged with serious offenses including unlawful transactions
with terrorists and aiding and abetting terrorist acts.163 He was also “a citizen
of Belgium, Sierra Leone, and Lebanon and has no significant ties to the
District of Columbia or the United States.”164 The court instead focused on
the tie to Lebanon, a non-extradition country, only cursorily in its discussion
of the security company Tajideen proposed to monitor him.165 The problem
with the court’s analysis in this case is its focus on his wealth as the factor
for his flight risk and detention. Again, Tajideen might have fairly been
detained; but finding he was wealthy and therefore a flight risk—and finding
he was wealthy and therefore not releasable—is not equalizing the system.
The ability to pay for certain conditions does not and should not always
mitigate certain findings of flight or danger to the community. In Epstein’s
case, the fake passport and possession of private planes, even if one was
posted as a bond, lends credence to the idea that he would be a flight risk
even if he had a GPS monitor and armed guards.166 And, in cases where there
is a rebuttable presumption for detention, like in Epstein’s, possession of a
fake passport and a plane does not rebut the presumption that he was not a
flight risk despite his mitigating conditions.

159
Id. at *4 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Hong Vo, 978 F. Supp. 2d 41, 46
(D.D.C. 2013)).
160
Id. at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
161
Id. The court also quoted Allen v. United States, saying that “[r]espect for law and order is
diminished when the attainment of pretrial liberty depends solely upon the financial status of an accused.”
386 F.2d 634, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1967). This analysis, however, cuts both ways. This is no different than the
Boustani II court saying that because of wealth, the defendant would be detained.
162
One recent, powerful argument has also focused on redefining how courts interpret what it means
to be a flight risk. This is also a crucial aspect of increasing defendant’s release pretrial, as the rebuttable
presumption for detention only applies when a defendant is found to be a flight risk or a danger to the
community. See generally Gouldin, supra note 149 (creating three categories for flight to recenter court’s
approach and separate findings of flight and danger).
163
Tajideen, 2018 WL 1342475, at *1.
164
Id. at *2.
165
Id. at *7.
166
See supra Part I (discussing Epstein’s bail package).
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“Least restrictive” factors in by looking practically at the statistics of
pretrial misconduct with the language of the Bail Reform Act.167 From 2008
to 2010, only 1% of federal defendants released pretrial failed to make their
court appearances.168 But in cases with wealthy defendants, their wealth
plays a factor in finding them flight risks.169 Another way to phrase the
debate is this: does wealth truly make an individual a flight risk?170 There is
no data on the wealth of the 1% of released defendants who fail to make
court appearances. Courts’ consideration of wealth in relation to detention
is cyclical. Because of the defendant’s wealth, courts require more
conditions in order to find that the danger of a flight risk is mitigated. Even
though flight risk is to be met by a preponderance of the evidence, the mere
factor of wealth appears to make a finding of mitigation impossible.
Flight is a real concern; there is a (very small) group of defendants who
flee, regardless of wealth.171 And, in rebuttable presumption cases like
Epstein’s, courts have a statutory duty to assess the case under the
presumption that there is no set of conditions that would mitigate flight. But
courts should focus their energy back on the language of the Bail Reform
Act, especially in light of the low statistics of flight in wealthy cases:
“whether any condition or combination of conditions . . . will reasonably
assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other
person and the community.”172 This is a purposefully high bar for rebuttable
presumption cases. The language of the Bail Reform Act reflects that it must
be impossible to impose any conditions that will mitigate either flight risk or
danger to the community to detain. And the court only needs to find these
conditions mitigated by a reasonable assurance, not an absolute. This
language implies that even “private prisons” would be acceptable because it
is a condition that would reasonably assure both appearance and a minimized
danger to the community.
Take again Sabhnani. There, a wealthy couple was charged with forced
labor and harboring undocumented immigrants for holding two women as
captives for domestic labor.173 The district court, after multiple proceedings
167

Pretrial misconduct is defined as “[i]nstances in which a released defendant violated their pretrial
release conditions.” THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRETRIAL RELEASE AND MISCONDUCT IN
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, 2008–2010 19 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prmfdc0810.pdf.
168
Id. at 1.
169
Gouldin, supra note 149, at 709 n.172 (giving examples from the First and Ninth circuits where
courts have analyzed a defendant’s resources in evaluating flight risk); Appleman, supra note 108, at
1299 (“Notwithstanding crime, the decision to imprison a defendant before trial all too often hinges on
wealth and power.”).
170
In her article, Professor Gouldin puts wealthier defendants in the category of “true flight risks”
because of their resources. Gouldin, supra note 149, at 727. But she also advocates for a defendant and
context-specific approach, calling for research to “study and evaluate whether selectively applying
financial conditions can effectively discourage flight for released defendants who have resources.” Id.
This is in line with the approach this Note advocates for.
171
Id. at 683.
172
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (emphasis added).
173
United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 2007).
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and some back and forth between the parties, found that no conditions could
mitigate a flight risk based upon the defendants’ financial disclosures, ability
to conduct business overseas, the strength of the evidence and lengthy prison
sentence if convicted, and a conclusion “that home detention was impractical
because it would require the imposition of onerous monitoring conditions on
defendants’ children, none of whom was charged with criminal conduct.”174
Judge Reena Raggi eloquently simplified the issue before the court and
rejected any further arguments from the government:
The Sabhnanis do not challenge the district court's finding that,
if released, they pose a serious risk of flight. Rather, they
challenge its conclusion that no conditions can be imposed that
would reasonably assure their presence at trial. We generally
accord considerable deference to such a district court
conclusion. In this case, however, defendants’ argument has
been cast in a new light by the government's identification in
this court of the further conditions it deems necessary to
ameliorate the risk of flight . . . . The government's ability to
identify such conditions and the defendants’ willingness to
accede to them preclude a conclusion in this case that no
conditions of release would reasonably assure the defendants’
presence at trial.175
This quite aptly sums up why home detention is not a problem under the
Bail Reform Act: because home detention means that there are conditions
that can be imposed that mitigate findings of flight. “Private prisons” in
one’s home are acceptable under this practical view of the Bail Reform Act
because the creation of a “private prison” means that there are conditions
which can be imposed to merit release. This reading fits with §
3142(c)(1)(B). Within § 3142(c)(1)(B), there is no limitation on what “least
restrictive” means. For a practical reading towards release, “least restrictive”
might actually be quite expansive; all that matters is that it is the least
restrictive means under which the mitigation is met.
One of the issues raised in the Epstein opinion is that the imposition of
such intensive restrictions is “not the Court’s function.”176 But home
detention is not uncommon for pretrial release.177 Notably, in 1987, the
Federal Judicial Board178 found that “home confinement may often qualify
as the least restrictive method of accomplishing the purposes of pretrial
174

Id. at 73.
Id. at 64–65.
176
Epstein Order, supra note 29, at 30.
177
See PROBATION CONDITIONS, supra note 146, at 72–73 (listing the different methods of home
confinement as conditions).
178
Interestingly, this Board included then District Judge José Cabranes, author of the Second
Circuit’s Boustani II opinion. PAUL J. HOFER & BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, FED. JUD. CTR., HOME
CONFINEMENT: AN EVOLVING SANCTION IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1987).
175
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release conditions.”179 Since then, the Pretrial Services Office has
recommended and monitored home confinement, with room for
improvement.180 While home confinement for wealthy individuals might not
be the least restrictive means, the Sabhnani opinion shows the kind of
defendant-specific analysis required by the Bail Reform Act in considering
home confinement for the wealthy. The Sabhnani court carefully
distinguished United States v. Orena, a prior Second Circuit opinion where
the court “expressed serious reservations about the adequacy of home
confinement as a substitute for detention in cases involving violent
crime.”181 The Sabhnani court found that there was a presumption for release
under the Bail Reform Act, that there were conditions such as visual
surveillance and electronic monitoring to minimize circumvention, that the
defendants proposed to pay all costs, that the government chose the private
security firm, and that the circumstances of violence in the underlying cases
were incomparable.182
One practical implication of an increase in conditions is “e-carceration.”
E-carceration is a new movement focusing on the negative impact of
conditions, including racial and social divides.183 The argument is centered
around the idea that electronic monitoring conditions, namely an electronic
ankle monitor, serve “as net-widening correctional strateg[ies]” expanding
the reach of the carceral system.184 One major problem with location
monitoring—often a facet of home release—is that “it replaces
less-restrictive forms of pretrial release or parole and saddles people with
the stigma and expense of ankle monitors.”185 As Professor Arnett notes,
there is a correlation between pretrial detention reform and electronic
179

Id. at 14.
See Marsh, supra note 17, at 17 (commenting on how detention alternatives “were not always
used or used effectively,” specifically noting that home confinement was imposed when it was not the
least restrictive condition). Home incarceration, according to the Federal Probation and Pretrial Services
office, is “24-hours-a-day lock-down except for medical necessities and court appearances or other
activities specifically approved by the court.” PROBATION CONDITIONS, supra note 146, at 73. This is
different from home detention, which “equires the defendant to remain at home at all times except for
pre-approved and scheduled absences for employment, education, religious activities, treatment, attorney
visits, court appearances, court-ordered obligations, or other activities as approved by the probation
officer.” Id.
181
United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 77 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Orena, 986
F.2d 628, 632–33 (2d Cir. 1993)).
182
Id. at 78.
183
See Jessica Eaglin, Is E-Carceration a Problem? Confronting the Shortcomings of Technological
Criminal Justice Reforms, JOTWELL (Aug. 2, 2019) (reviewing Professor Arnett’s article)). But see
NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ELECTRONIC MONITORING REDUCES RECIDIVISM 1 (2011)
(noting a study of Florida offenders “found that monitoring significantly reduces the likelihood of failure
under community supervision” by a 31% decrease in the likelihood of failure).
184
Chaz Arnett, From Decarceration to E-carceration, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 641, 641 (2019).
185
E.A. Gjelten, House Arrest and Ankle Monitors: How Home Detention Works and When It’s
Used, LAWYERS.COM (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/criminal/criminal-lawbasics/home-confinement-as-an-alternative-to-prison.html.
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monitoring.186 The crux, as he explains it, is the goal of fighting an increase
in incarceration, the vast majority of which is pretrial detainees, as
aforementioned.187 The problem then comes as electronic monitoring “shifts
the site and costs of imprisonment from state facilities to vulnerable
communities and households of color”188 and further entrenching
marginalized groups via surveillance.
The concerns of “e-carceration” guide what our release for indigent
defendants should look like through a practical lens. Because the
government is saved from the cost of detention by putting it onto wealthy
defendants, theoretically, it eases the burden on the government such that
more money can potentially be spent on conditions for indigent defendants
to mitigate the Boustani problem. One suggested idea has been a give a
guard, get a guard idea where wealthy defendants released to home detention
chip into a pot, the proceeds of which go to paying for conditions for indigent
defendants so they can also be released.189 This idea assumes that guards
“virtually guarantee[]” the defendant’s appearance at court, thus
immediately mitigating any flight risk.190 There is also an argument that in
the case of defendants detained because of a flight risk, they have a right to
be monitored in order to avoid detention.191 By having wealthy defendants,
as part of their conditions for release, chip in money to a general probation
fund means that the government can more easily take on the cost of
electronic surveillance and avoid putting the burden on minority
communities. And, if more individuals are overall released, as is the goal of
this Note, then whatever money they government would have spent on
defendants pretrial can go to funding their conditions or helpful programs,
discussed more below. It does mitigate some of Professor Arnett’s concern
about cost imposition but does nothing to lift the worry of stigmatization and
entrenchment in marginalized groups. A security guard in this instance is no
different than an ankle monitor, and home still won’t be home.192 But it
allows a defendant to escape prison, potentially continue employment, and
engage in more post-arrest rehabilitative measures that have been shown to
play a role in sentencing.193
There is also a concern that expanding the breadth of conditions imposed
is unduly restrictive, and, being impossible to meet, essentially guarantee a
186

Arnett, supra note 184, at 651.
Id. at 648. See also Onyekwere, supra note 1 (stating that about 70% of the current prison
population is pretrial detainees).
188
Arnett, supra note 184, at 655.
189
Klein, supra note 106.
190
Id.
191
See Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344,
1348 (2014) (proposing “reverse” arguments in favor of electronic monitoring to allow for release for
defendants found to be a flight risk).
192
Arnett, supra note 184, at 643.
193
See infra Section III.C for a discussion of the effects of prison.
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defendant will be incarcerated pretrial for failing to meet the conditions. This
is a major concern, but the requirement of “least restrictive” hopefully serves
as a check on undue conditions. Conditions should only be imposed to the
extent they are needed to check any potential finding that triggers a
rebuttable presumption; anything more violates the Bail Reform Act and the
spirit of this Note.
Reading the Bail Reform Act practically means that courts need to focus
on conditions authorizing release. Courts need to return to the
defendant-specific approached championed by Sabhnani.194 Practically
reading the Bail Reform Act for release for the wealthy, as this Section has
argued, includes reading release for the indigent. A practical reading means
refocusing on the language of the Bail Reform Act pointing towards release
and utilizing it in a defendant-specific context; this applies regardless of the
defendant’s wealth.
C. A Societal Approach to Release
“Least restrictive” can also be read to provide positive pathways for
defendants to be rehabilitated, causing long-term positive changes for their
lives going forward. Reading “least restrictive” in light of societal needs
means that courts should focus not only on release but on rehabilitative
conditions. If a court can consider the vast conditions that a wealthy
individual could afford as part of setting bail, then a court should be able to
consider rehabilitative factors available upon release for indigent
defendants. This resolves the disparate pretrial treatment between wealthy
and indigent defendants created by Boustani II. By advocating for
generalized decarceration and allowing for more release, this allows
defendants to take advantage of the rehabilitative conditions and programs
available through pretrial services which “help[] defendants acquire and use
prosocial life skills with a focus on cognitive and choice awareness,
recognition of the motive and influence of others, problem solving and
deductive reasoning.”195 Leveling up the meaning of “least restrictive” to a
broad array of conditions positively impacts both groups of defendants, and
society as a whole.
While federal prisons do have rehabilitative programming, released
defendants have greater access to community resources, as well as
interactive programs such as Support Court, which is not open to
incarcerated individuals. And the rehabilitative programs within the Bureau
of Prisons are voluntary. Having program attendance be a condition of
release requires defendants to participate, which can provide them with
194
One way to engage in this defendant specific analysis would be through risk assessment tools.
However, this Note will not discuss risk assessment tools because recent articles have exposed how
unreliable and discriminatory these tools can be. For examples of articles discussing risk assessment in
the pretrial context, see supra note 4.
195
Rowland, supra note 2, at 18.
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services that they would not have otherwise sought out for themselves.
Viewing “least restrictive” in this light adds a new weight to the bail
determination balance: an interest in rehabilitation. This again allows “least
restrictive” to become quite expansive and encapsulate conditions other than
those that go directly toward flight and danger prevention, to those that
actually benefit the defendant. As part of setting conditions of release, a
judge can have a defendant actively seek employment, continue or start an
education program, get medical or psychiatric treatment, participate in
inpatient or outpatient programs, or any other condition as the court and
pretrial services see fit.196 And some positive conditions also simply are not
available in prison. While defendants may be able to have a job in prison,
they are likely not able to keep the job they had before being charged,
whereas release allows that opportunity. Family access is also incomparable;
family members may be able to visit a defendant in prison, but that is a far
cry from what a familial relationship looks like in our society. Maintaining
employment and family relationships are crucial for rehabilitating a
defendant and preventing future crime.197
Arguing for wealthy defendants to be released based upon conditions
they can afford then allows for a broader consideration of what conditions
actually mitigate flight and danger across the board.198 This opens up more
consideration for mitigating and rehabilitative conditions such as these and
serves as a pathway for increased release.
Mass incarceration is a massive problem in the United States, and pretrial
detention is a large part of that. It is in society’s best interest to read the Bail
Reform Act in this context and in light of each defendant’s role in society.
This includes wealthy defendants; arguing for the release of wealthy
defendants based upon the conditions they can afford can help further the
overall societal interest in decarceration, which positively affects indigent
defendants. Another incarcerated individual is a burden on the system, whether
rich or poor. In this context, any release where the defendant does not pose
more societal harm is beneficial; even releasing defendants to a private jail.
When reading “least” restrictive in a societal manner, courts should
incorporate the costs of incarceration when considering whether factors
mitigate flight risk or danger to the defendant.199 Doing so adds further
196
U.S. CTS., ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OF RELEASE (2011), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/defa
ult/files/ao199b.pdf.
197
Gjelten, supra note 185.
198
This obviously says nothing of the important considerations of who is considered a flight risk
and what is considered a danger to the community. See generally Gouldin, supra note 169 (redefining
what it means to be a flight risk by creating three categories); Rowland, supra note 2, at 17 (noting that the
list of charges subject to a rebuttable presumption might not actually predict danger to the community).
199
The federal government spends around $1.5 billion on pretrial detention compared to $177
million on community supervision and “$134 million on contract services to assist defendants with basic
life necessities, needed medical and addiction treatment, and employment services.” Rowland, supra note
2, at 13, 16, 17. Presumably, more money will be spent on community supervision and contracts if more
defendants are released while the cost of incarceration will decrease. The money spent may not be
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context for considering whether certain conditions are indicated. This then
raises the bar for what “least restrictive” means by incorporating advancing
societally beneficial goals into its meaning. “Least restrictive,” just as the
approaches above suggested, then expands to include those conditions that
the judge finds would keep a defendant, of any means, out of jail.
The costs of incarceration are notably high. Federal pretrial detention
centers are overcrowded and understaffed, leading to “neglect and
violence.”200 In 2019, there were roughly 51,000 individuals being
monitored by the U.S. Marshals, the office responsible for monitoring
pretrial detainees.201 Pretrial detainees are housed in detention centers,
correctional centers, federal transfer centers, private prisons, and sometimes
even local jails, 202 with the U.S. Marshall service renting around 26,200 jail
cells to house pretrial detainees.203
Incarceration has been linked to an increase in depression and an
increased risk of self-harm and suicide in younger detainees.204 Detention is
linked to wrongful convictions, longer sentences, and recidivism.205 Pretrial
detention also “has a corrosive effect on defendants—separating them from
their legal team, family, and other potentially prosocial connections in the
community.”206 Incarceration, even pretrial, affects employment.207 It also
leads to an increase in suspicion and aggression on the part of the
defendant.208 Those who have been incarcerated face stigma after their
release, and the poverty, unemployment, and social isolation resulting from
incarceration lead to an increased risk of health problems.209 And these
effects are disproportionally borne by “poor, uneducated people of color,
about half of whom suffer from mental health problems.”210 Roughly 45%
of federal prisoners suffer from mental illnesses,211 and 10–25% of prisoners
decreased overall, but there is a stark difference in what that money does for defendants who are
incarcerated versus released.
200
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have serious mental illnesses including schizophrenia.212 Black defendants
specifically are “more likely to be incarcerated before trial.”213 Incarceration
also affects the families left behind, as they feel anger and shame, affecting
intrapersonal relationships.214 Additionally, the children of incarcerated
defendants have increased risks of poverty, mental health problems, and
behavioral issues, which increase the likelihood that they will be
incarcerated later on.215
Because of “increased discretion and a lack of public scrutiny”
associated with pretrial detention, “the potential of racial bias impacting this
decision is increased.”216 While this is most keenly felt in the state systems,
the federal system is not immune. As Professor Cynthia Jones has
documented, even at the federal level, with objective statutory factors to
consider, notable racial disparities in bail determinations exist.217 The
documented study from the early 1990s notes that while “race did not
significantly affect pretrial release outcomes,” white defendants received
more benefit from stratification factors, such as education income, as
opposed to Black defendants with comparable backgrounds.218 And, as
noted previously, the racial disparities are more keenly seen today through
the types of charges being brought and the impact those charges have on the
statutory factors and the detention decision.219
In this context, “least restrictive” then becomes almost a ceiling,
meaning a judge can impose the conditions necessary to keep a defendant
out of jail in light of the aforementioned problems, though limited by the
considerations of over conditioning mentioned above. This then treats both
wealthy and indigent defendants in the same manner and advocates for the
release of both. The idea of the wealthy building a “private prison” then
becomes less of a quandary if indigent defendants are also taken care of. The
beauty of releasing wealthy defendants to these home prisons is that the
212
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wealthy defendant pays for the conditions, reducing the cost on the
government. An increase in wealthy at home detention would then mean
more money for positive pretrial programs for indigent defendants.
Sentencing mitigation programs are a new phenomenon, and “24 districts
now have formal judge-involved intervention and treatment programs, with
even more informal programs of various sizes.”220 One example is the
District of Connecticut’s Support Court. The program brings together
federal judges, the United States Attorney’s Office, the Federal Defender’s
Office, and the Pretrial Services Office to support and aid defendants with
substance abuse treatment at the pretrial and post-conviction stages.221
Support Court works with defendants who have substance abuse problems
to serve as a “comprehensive treatment program,”222 with goals such as
having defendants: remain drug-free, be law-abiding, improve their
employability and education, improve their social skills, enhance their
self-esteem, learn relapse warnings signs and develop a relapse plan,
improve their financial education and responsibility, cope with problems,
and develop time management skills.223 Under a societal approach, the
conditions for release for indigent defendants can become rehabilitative.
Considering the societal impact and effect of incarceration is an
important gloss that allows courts to read “least restrictive” in a manner that
cuts against the idea of a “private prison” and instead allows for societal
improvement through a decrease in government spending, a decrease in
incarceration, and, hopefully, an increase in rehabilitative pretrial programs
for indigent defendants.
CONCLUSION
“Freedom comes from human beings, rather than from laws and
institutions.”224 While the Bail Reform Act provides the essential
framework, it is ultimately within judicial (human) discretion to detain or
release. It is imperative that considerations of wealth are not allowed to
factor in a judge’s mind. As this Note sought to demonstrate, detaining
wealthy individuals in order to prevent a “two-tiered bail system” is not the
answer. Nor is releasing wealthy defendants at the expense of indigent
defendants. Instead, the answer is to read “least restrictive” with the Bail
Reform Act with an eye toward release. And in order to force this
perspective, the lens must be shifted. Detaining everyone to avoid disparities
does nothing for any party: defendant, prosecutor, judge, or civilian.
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Releasing everyone leads to risks of flight, and in rare cases, recidivism. It
is possible to find a balance. Boustani II’s holding does not solve inequitable
treatment. It makes injustice equal.

